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Extra-pair parentage: a new theory based on
transactions in a cooperative game
Erol Akçay* and Joan Roughgarden
Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University,
371 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
ABSTRACT
Question: What is the adaptive significance of extra-pair parentage?
Theoretical approach: We view parentage as a ‘transaction currency’ for exchanges of
ecological benefits. We develop a multi-player cooperative game, using the core and the Nash
bargaining solution as solution concepts.
Model assumptions: Birds can negotiate about who pairs with whom. Parentage can be
exchanged between individuals as a result of negotiations. Number of offspring fledged from
a nest depends on the experience and situation of the social parents and not on their genes
(i.e. only direct benefits, no genetic benefits).
Predictions: We predict extra-pair parentage to occur when individuals with higher breeding
capability are paired to individuals with lower breeding capability. Social interactions between
males are predicted to precede the occurrence of extra-pair paternity. We give an example
experiment to test our model.
Keywords: cooperative games, direct benefits, extra-pair paternity, genetic benefits, negotiation,
social selection.
BACKGROUND
Most bird species are socially monogamous and cooperate in raising offspring (Cockburn, 2006).
However, with the advent of molecular methods to assign parentage in the wild, the picture
changed remarkably: in most species, some nests contain young that are sired by males other
than their social parent [called extra-pair paternity (Griffith et al., 2002)]. Less frequently
encountered, but still fairly common, are nests that contain young whose genetic mother is
not the female tending the nest [extra-pair maternity (Yom-Tov, 2001)].1 These two phenomena
together represent an interesting problem in evolutionary biology: breeders in such nests
1 We use the term ‘extra-pair maternity’ for all cases where the social mother is excluded as a genetic parent. The
terms widely used in the literature are intraspecific brood parasitism and quasi-parasitism. In intraspecific brood
parasitism, both the social mother and father are excluded as the genetic parent, corresponding to simultaneous
extra-pair paternity and extra-pair maternity. On the other hand, quasi-parasitism is extra-pair maternity only.
See ‘Discussion’ for more on the issue.
* Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed. e-mail: erol@stanford.edu
Consult the copyright statement on the inside front cover for non-commercial copying policies.
Evolutionary Ecology Research, 2007, 9: 1223–1243
© 2007 Erol Akçay
invest in offspring that are not their own genetically. Intuition suggests that such an
evolutionary ‘mistake’ should be selected against, yet the fact that extra-pair parentage
occurs commonly throughout bird species strongly suggests that there are also selective
pressures that favour the occurrence of this phenomenon. Consequently, many researchers
are trying to uncover the function of extra-pair parentage.
Extra-pair paternity is the more common of the two extra-pair parentage phenomena,
and is studied much more widely. Even before extra-pair paternity began to be documented
in birds, Trivers (1972) argued that males in monogamous species should be selected both
to seek extra-pair copulations and to guard their mates from copulation attempts by
other males. Later, Møller and Birkhead (1993) observed that the frequencies of extra-pair
copulations are higher in colonially breeding species than in dispersed nesters, and
stipulated that extra-pair paternity should be positively correlated with breeding density.
However, comparative evidence failed to provide consistent support for this prediction
(Westneat and Sherman, 1997; Griffith et al., 2002). Similarly, Stutchbury and Morton (1995) suggested
that breeding synchrony is positively related to levels of extra-pair paternity, but later
research again failed to provide conclusive support to this claim (reviewed in Griffith et al., 2002).
Meanwhile, an increasing focus on the role of females in reproductive decisions (Gowaty,
1996) shifted attention to the benefits of extra-pair paternity to females (Petrie and Kempenaers,
1998). This shift came with an emphasis on indirect, genetic benefits (Birkhead and Møller, 1992;
Petrie and Kempenaers, 1998). This was based on the argument that material exchanges
and other direct benefits are unlikely to be involved in extra-pair copulations compared
with within-pair copulations because of the limited social and physical association
between individuals who are presumed to come in contact to copulate only. Two different
genetic benefits hypotheses, namely the good genes and the compatible genes hypotheses
[corresponding to additive and non-additive genetic effects, respectively (Neff and Pitcher, 2005)],
became the focus of extensive research effort. In a companion paper (Akçay and Roughgarden,
2007a), we summarize the results of this effort to identify indirect benefits to extra-pair
copulations in nature. We found that empirical tests of both of the genetic benefits
hypotheses have yielded equivocal results at best that can be interpreted as refuting genetic
benefits in general.
Recently, Westneat and Stewart (2003) argued for a new multi-player approach to extra-pair
paternity. They suggested focusing on behavioural interactions between the individual birds
themselves rather than on their genes, and claimed that the patterns of extra-pair paternity
result from conflicts between individuals. In line with their argument, Arnqvist and
Kirkpatrick (2005) proposed that extra-pair copulations are the result of male strategies that
are simply imposed on the females. According to this view, females are not indifferent
to extra-pair copulation attempts, but they are caught between harassment from
extra-pair males and the danger of losing parental contribution from their social mate.
Thus, they engage in extra-pair copulations while trying to minimize the total cost imposed
on them. Although this ‘sexual conflict’ hypothesis has yet to be directly tested, it already
faces difficulties in light of what we know about extra-pair paternity. First, bird repro-
ductive anatomy lends females substantial control over copulation access and fertilization
(Gowaty and Buschhaus, 1998), suggesting that females are not greatly susceptible to coercion.
Furthermore, behavioural evidence indicates that females are frequently active participants
in extra-pair copulations (e.g. Wagner, 1992; Double and Cockburn, 2000) rather than victims of male
copulation attempts. Indeed, females sometimes travel outside their territories seeking
extra-pair copulations (Westneat and Stewart, 2003). Females can also solicit extra-pair copulations
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from males that intrude into their territories in addition to accepting or rejecting extra-pair
copulation attempts initiated by intruding males (e.g. Currie et al., 1999). These undermine the
empirical foundation of the sexual conflict hypothesis.
A new approach to extra-pair parentage
This paper presents a new approach to possible benefits of extra-pair parentage. We propose
that extra-pair parentage should be viewed as a ‘transaction currency’ in a social breeding
system, functioning in the exchange of commodities and services required for offspring
production. We use the term ‘commodity’ to include necessities for breeding such as nest
sites and mates (see Wagner et al., 2000, for another instance of such usage). The term ‘services’, on the other
hand, comprises activities such as nest defence and provisioning. We suggest that indi-
viduals or pairs can negotiate and agree on gaining access to such services or commodities
and ‘pay’ for them using parentage. This approach is related to reproductive transactions
theory (Vehrencamp, 1983; Shellman-Reeve and Reeve, 2000) (see ‘Discussion’). We present a model for the
exchange of the most basic necessities of breeding: a mate and a breeding territory. The
model employs cooperative game theory, which allows agreements and side-payments to
take place between individuals (Roughgarden et al., 2006).
In the next section, we introduce and analyse the cooperative game model for the
formation of stable pairing arrangements of socially monogamous pairs. Next, we show
that this model can predict some of the well-documented patterns of extra-pair parentage.
We then outline some predictions unique to our model and discuss how it can be tested and
compared with existing models. In the last section, we discuss the major assumptions and
limitations of our model in some detail. We conclude with some general comments on the
relation of our approach to reproductive transactions theory and the use of cooperative
game theory.
EXTRA-PAIR PARENTAGE AND SOCIAL BREEDING ARRANGEMENTS
One of the first breeding decisions by individual birds is to choose a social mate. Individuals
of different sexes in a given breeding neighbourhood (such as a patch of woods) can be
thought as a pool from which socially monogamous pairs are to be formed. Individuals
in such a context can be expected to make adaptive choices that maximize their
expected fitness. We model these choices using game theory. Our model is borrowed from
the economics literature on human marriages; it is a modified version of Gary Becker’s
influential ‘marriage market’ model (Becker, 1973) that initiated the economic study of human
marriages.
Let us first consider a numerical example using the simplest pairing problem with two
males and two females. We assume that each possible pair can expect to fledge a certain
number of young from their nest, and that this number is a function of individual
phenotypes (e.g. parental ability or breeding experience) as well as ecological parameters
(e.g. territory quality or predation pressure). We assume that all offspring in a given nest are
equally likely to survive to fledgling, such that the number of fledglings from a nest does not
depend on the actual genetic parents of the offspring. The number of fledglings produced
by each pair can then be arranged in what we call a ‘pairing matrix’. An example is given in
equation (1):










This pairing matrix is to be read as follows: Male 1 can expect to fledge four offspring if
he pairs with Female 1, but only one if he pairs with Female 2. Similarly, Male 2 would
produce five young with Female 1, but four with Female 2. These numbers denote the
fledgling production from the nest; the actual pay-off to each individual is the total number
of genetic offspring produced on and off their own nests – that is, total reproductive success.
Becker’s (1973) original analysis assumes that the production of a pair, and thus the pay-off,
is transferable between partners. We cannot allow this in our model, since the unit of
production is offspring fledged and each offspring must have exactly one father and one
mother. The outcome of the pairing process then depends on whether we allow extra-pair
parentage or not. If individuals are the genetic parents of all offspring in their nests and but










where the first entry in each cell is the pay-off to the male and the second to the female.
According to these pay-offs, we expect the pairings Male 2–Female 1 and Male 1–Female 2
to form: Male 2 and Female 1 have the highest production with each other, which would
also be their actual pay-off. Thus, neither of them would have any incentive to pair with
another individual.
Now suppose that we allow individuals to have only partial parentage in their broods and
sire eggs in or dump eggs to other nests. Note that Male 1 and Female 2 stand much to lose
if they pair with each other, relative to what they could produce with Female 1 and Male 2
respectively. Male 1 can try to avoid this by negotiating with Male 2 to let him pair with
Female 1. Initially, Male 2 should not agree, because he would produce a lower number of
offspring if he refrains from pairing with Female 1 and pairs with Female 2 instead. But
Male 1 can offer him access to Female 1 such that Male 2 fertilizes, say, two of the eggs in
the clutch that Male 1 would have with Female 1. Such an arrangement would give Male 2 a
total of six offspring, four from his clutch with Female 2, and two from the nest of Male 1
and Female 1. Conversely, Male 1 would sire two offspring in his clutch with Female 1,










Such a deal would be acceptable to both males, since both would be siring more offspring
relative to the arrangement with no extra-pair paternity. In this way, extra-pair paternity can
arise as ‘side-payments’ that stabilize a certain social pairing arrangement. Note that Male 1
does not need to guarantee Male 2 the paternity of exactly two of the eggs in his nest.
Rather, Male 2 simply requires that the expected number of offspring he sires in Male
1’s nest to be two, which he can ensure by having adequate copulation access to Female 1
(Burke et al., 1989).
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What about the females? In the above arrangement, Female 1 seems to be losing out,
since she pairs with Male 1 and produces four offspring instead of five. Two things
might happen in this case. First, Female 1 can be compensated for this loss with a similar
agreement between the females: to secure Female 1’s cooperation, Female 2 can allow her to
dump two eggs (fertilized by Male 2) into the nest of Female 2 with Male 2. This would
bring the pay-off to Female 1 to six, while keeping the pay-off to Female 2 at two, which is
still greater than the one offspring she would mother if she paired with Male 1 instead. This
outcome predicts extra-pair maternity in addition to extra-pair paternity. Alternatively,
Female 1 might not be compensated and thus would have no incentive to cooperate on this
arrangement. She might, for example, refuse to copulate with Male 2, leading to forced
extra-pair copulations or other forms of conflict behaviour between Female 1 and the
males. The presence and extent of such conflict would be determined by the outside options
available to the female as well as other benefits that might be involved.
The pairing market described above is analysed as a cooperative game. In a cooperative
game, coalitions can form that act in concert and negotiate the distribution of pay-off they
accrue. The solution of a cooperative game describes which coalitions are formed and what
pay-off each player accrues from the outcome. Cooperative game theory offers a variety
of solution concepts that can be applied to any given game (see Aumann, 1989). Here, we employ
the solution concept called ‘the core’. The core of a cooperative game is a set of coalitions
and pay-off distributions such that for any element of the core, there are no coalitions that
can act separately from the rest of the players and still give all coalitions members at least
their pay-off in the core distribution. Note that this is analogous to the Nash equilibrium
concept in non-cooperative games but much stronger: the Nash equilibrium stipulates that
no individual deviation from the equilibrium strategy is profitable. Here, no individual or
group deviation is profitable. Below, we introduce some notation and give a mathematical
definition of the core.
Analysing the pairing matrix










where x i, j denote the number of offspring fledged from the nest of the pair Male i–Female j.
The pay-off to each individual is the number of genetic offspring, which we label with m i for
males and f j for females. (Specifically, m i is the expected number offspring sired by male i,
which is based on his copulation frequencies with different females; see ‘Discussion’.)
The numbers m i and f j include both the genetic offspring within each individual’s own
clutch and any extra-pair offspring they might sire or mother, so that m i and f j are not
necessarily equal to x i, j. We denote a pairing arrangement by a vector z
→ with two elements,
where each element zi specifies which female Male i is paired with under the pairing
arrangement. The total number of offspring fledged from all the n nests is denoted by
X(z→) = Σi x i,zi . [Obviously, Σi m i = Σj f j = X(z
→).]
The core specifies both a pairing arrangement and how much parentage each individual
gains or loses, resulting in the pay-offs m i and f j. We can then define the core in terms of
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these pay-offs: it is the set of pairing arrangements z→ and pay-off vectors m→ and f
→
that satisfy two conditions. First, one or both of the following two inequalities must hold
for all x i, j:
m i ≥ x i, j
f j ≥ x i, j
. (5)
To see why, suppose that for some x i, j that are not in the core pairing arrangement, neither
of the inequalities (5) hold. Then both Male i and Female j would prefer to leave the core
arrangement and pair with each other instead. Therefore, the pair of pay-offs m i and f j that
do not satisfy either (or both) of the inequalities (5) cannot be part of the core.
The second condition for the core is the following:
X(z→) ≥ X(z→) for all z→ , (6)
which says that the core pairing arrangement has to maximize total output from the pairing
matrix. To see why again, suppose that the core did not maximize the total output. Then a
coalition consisting of all males or all females (or both) could form and adopt the pairing
arrangement that does maximize the total output. They could then redistribute parentage
between nests, such that every individual receives an equal or better pay-off than what they
would be getting at the core, contradicting the definition of the core.
This property of the core provides us with a simple method to determine when and where
extra-pair parentage should occur. We first find the pairing arrangement that maximizes the
total output to satisfy condition (6), and then we calculate the pay-offs each individual has
to get to satisfy condition (5). The discrepancy between the pay-offs calculated in this way
and the nest production of each individual under the pairing arrangement determines how
much parentage each one loses or gains.
We apply the method to the pairing matrix above (equation 4). There are two distinct
patterns of relative productivity of different nests:
1. One individual of each sex, say Male 1 and Female 1, consistently produces more
offspring than the other. This can be expressed as x i,1 > x i,2 and x1, j > x2, j for i, j = 1, 2.
This corresponds to the case where an individual’s traits (or its ecological circumstances)
create a consistent effect on its productivity.
2. Each male produces more offspring than the other when paired to a different female (or
vice versa). For example, x1,1 > x2,1 but x2,2 > x1,2, i.e. Male 1 produces more offspring
with Female 1 than Male 2 does, but Male 2 produces more offspring with Female 2 than
Male 1 does. In this case, the productivity of the pair is determined by the interaction of
individuals’ traits such that there is no consistent high productivity individual.
Consider case 2 first: there are two possible pairing arrangements, z→1 = (1, 2)
and z→2 = (2, 1). Condition (6) means that z
→
1 is the core arrangement, since
x1,1 + x2,2 > x1,2 + x2,1. In that situation, no extra-pair parentage is needed to stabilize the
arrangement, as each individual already receives the highest pay-off they can get from their
own nest. Thus, if there are no consistent differences in offspring production between
individuals, our model does not predict extra-pair parentage.
For case 1, there are two sub-cases: either x1,1 + x2,2 ≥ x1,2 + x2,1, or the reverse. In the
former, Male 1 will be paired with Female 1, and Male 2 with Female 2, and there will be no
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extra-pair parentage, since each individual’s production from its own nest satisfies condition
(5). In the second sub-case, however, the core prescribes the arrangement z→2. But x1,1 > x1,2
by assumption, and condition (5) requires that m1 ≥ x1,1. Thus, Male 1 needs to gain some
paternity in Male 2’s nest. If we label by pmin the minimum amount of extra-pair paternity
Male 1 has to gain, we can write:
pmin = x1,1 − x1,2 . (7)
In other words, Male 1 has to gain enough paternity to at least bring him to the number of
genetic offspring he would have if he simply paired with Female 1 and sired all young
in their nest. Our model thus predicts extra-pair parentage only if some individuals are
consistently better at producing offspring than others and if these higher productivity
individuals are paired with partners of lower productivity. This method for calculating the
core arrangement and the extra-pair parentage is directly applicable to general n × n
matrices.
Equation (7) calculates the minimum side-payment that an individual requires to agree to
a core pairing arrangement. We can also calculate the maximum side-payment each indi-
vidual is willing to make to secure the cooperation of other individuals for a core pairing
arrangement. This is done by subtracting the production of the non-preferred pairing from
the production of the preferred pairing. In the second example for case 1 above, the non-
preferred pairing for Male 2 is with Female 2, and the preferred one is with Female 1.
Therefore, Male 2 would be willing to concede to Male 1 some paternity of a clutch with
Female 1, provided he still retains at least as much paternity as he would get in a pairing
with Female 2. Thus, the maximum parentage loss Male 2 will accept is:
pmax = x2,1 − x2,2 . (8)
Any side-payment between pmin and pmax will stabilize the core arrangement so the core
actually specifies a range of parentage. Which value will be selected from this range? The
answer to this question depends on the negotiation process between the individuals who are
exchanging side-payments. Below, we characterize a plausible outcome of this negotiation
process.
Predicting extra-pair parentage
The core arrangement in our pairing matrix results in an increase in total offspring
production, creating a surplus pay-off relative to each individual acting alone. Since every
individual has to get at least their default pay-offs in any negotiated outcome, we can cast
the problem in terms of how to distribute that surplus. We need to consider the males and
females separately, because the pay-off (i.e. parentage) cannot be transfered between the
sexes. In a 2 × 2 pairing matrix, this process gives rise to two separate two-player games. The
outcome of such two-player bargaining games can be characterized by the Nash Bargaining
Solution [NBS (Nash, 1950)], which stipulates that the solution maximizes the product of the
two players’ pay-offs relative to their default pay-offs.
To apply the NBS to the negotiation of parentage exchange, consider a 2 × 2 pairing
matrix with a core that prescribes side-payments. Specifically, assume that x i,1 > x i,2
and x1, j > x2, j for i, j = 1, 2, and that x1,2 + x2,1 = x1,1 + x2,2 + d, with d > 0 denoting the
surplus that results from the core. Let us consider the negotiation between the males. (The
negotiation between the females follows in a similar way.) The default pay-offs are x1,1 for
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Male 1 and x2,2 for Male 2. If the actual pay-offs are m1 and m2, the males’ gain relative
to their default pay-offs are m1 − x1,1 and m2 − x2,2. Furthermore, m1 + m2 = x1,1 + x2,2 + d.
Thus, the product of the relative gains can be written as:
(m1 − x1,1)(m2 − x2,2) = (x2,2 + d − m2)(m2 − x2,2)




2,2 + m2d − x2,2d . (9)
To find the maximum of this product, we take the derivative of the expression on the
right-hand side with respect to m2, set equal to zero, and solve for m2:





Thus, the NBS predicts that Male 2 receives d/2 in addition to his default pay-off, which
means that Male 1 is also receiving d/2 over his default pay-off; the NBS prescribes an equal
partitioning of the surplus between the two males. The actual extra-pair paternity gained by




+ x1,1 − x1,2 . (11)
The NBS for the females’ game is calculated separately in the same way. Since the surplus
d and the default pay-offs are the same for the females as well, the females’ NBS prescribes
the same division of parentage as that of the males: females will also divide the surplus
equally among themselves (if they divide it at all, see above).
We can now apply this result to the pairing matrix in equation (1) above. There, d = 2 and
thus each individual must receive the parentage of one more offspring in addition to their
default pay-offs. The default pay-off for Male 1 and Female 2 is one, so the NBS prescribes
a net pay-off of two to them, while for Male 2 and Female 1 the net pay-off has to be six. To
achieve this, Male 2 has to receive the paternity of two offspring in the nest of Male 1 and
Female 1, while Female 1 has to lay two eggs (fathered by Male 2) into the nest of Female 2
with Male 2.
The NBS can be reached by different behavioural processes (see Roughgarden et al., 2006; Akçay
and Roughgarden, 2007b). The behavioural basis of how individuals negotiate an outcome
is an empirical question. For example, a candidate might be the dawn chorus of some song
birds. A recent study has shown that the dawn chorus has a role in the social dynamics
between males in a breeding neighbourhood of banded wrens (Burt and Vehrencamp, 2005). We
conjecture that the dawn chorus might also play a role in negotiations between males over
paternity exchanges, in which case a correlation between dawn chorus interactions and
paternity gain or loss would be expected.
Individual traits and extra-pair parentage
Now, we look in more detail at how the entries x i, j in the pairing matrix are determined and
how extra-pair parentage is related to individual traits and/or ecological variables. Note that
we assume that the genetic parents of an offspring do not affect their survival to fledgling.
The production of each nest depends instead on the phenotypes of the individuals tending
Akçay and Roughgarden1230
that nest or on ecological factors such as territory quality. As in case 1 in the analysis of
the pairing matrix above, some individuals might possess traits (such as age or condition)
that enable them to fledge more offspring, regardless of their social partners’ traits.
Alternatively, the two sexes might have traits (for example, joint breeding experience) with
the pair production depending on the combination. Below, we investigate these cases in
more detail.
Suppose that individuals vary in some trait that influences offspring production in the
nest. We denote the traits in males and females with s and t, respectively, and express the
offspring production from a nest as a function of these traits:
x i, j = g(si, tj) . (12)
Suppose also that
∂g(s, t)
∂ s > 0 and 
∂g(s, t)
∂ t > 0 , (13)
meaning that offspring production increases with both the male and the female traits
(corresponding to case 1 above). We order males and females according to their trait value,
such that sn > sn − 1 > . . . > s1 and tn > tn − 1 > . . . > t1. (For simplicity, we assume that no two
individuals have the same value for a trait.) Now, if the stable arrangement z→ requires no
extra-pair parentage, it must be true that each individual’s partner must be of the same rank
as themselves. Thus, Male n is paired to Female n, Male n − 1 to Female n − 1, and so on. To
see why, suppose Male i is paired to Female j with i > j. Then, there will be at least one
female of rank k ≥ i who is paired to a male of rank l < i. But because of the inequalities in
(13), this means that
x i,k > x i, j and x i,k > x l,k .
Therefore, if Male i or Female k do not receive any extra-pair parentage, condition (5) is not
satisfied for the pairing x i,k. Thus, the arrangement z
→ cannot be stable without extra-pair
parentage. We can also see by a similar argument that whenever there is perfectly assortative
pairing, no extra-pair parentage is required. Therefore, our model predicts extra-pair
parentage if and only if there are some disassortative pairings – that is, pairings between
a low-rank male and a high-rank female.
When is there a perfectly assortative pairing arrangement in the core? Due to condition
(6), this is equivalent to asking when the assortative pairing arrangement maximizes the
total output. One can show that if
∂ 2g(s, t)
∂ s∂t > 0 , (14)
assortative pairing maximizes total offspring production. [A proof can be found in Becker
(1973, Appendix, section 1).] Therefore, if inequality (14) holds, assortative pairing will be the core
arrangement. Conversely, if the reverse of (14) holds, negative assortment maximizes
the total output and is the core arrangement. In this case, disassortative pairing creates a
surplus in the total number of offspring produced relative to assortative pairing. This
surplus is then redistributed by extra-pair paternity to compensate individuals of higher
productivity for not pairing with their preferred mates.
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The mixed derivative in inequality (14) is an index of whether the male and female traits
and their function in offspring rearing are substitutes or complements to each other in the
economic sense. For example, the right-hand side will be positive when males and females
each perform different tasks that are both necessary for successful breeding, and the traits s
and t reflect their effectiveness in their respective tasks. An extreme example is provided by
hornbills (Bucerotidae). The female hornbill seals herself off in the nest during egg laying
and incubation and depends entirely on male feeding during this period, which can last for
2 months (Stanback et al., 2002). Here, the traits of the female (e.g. health) and the male
(e.g. provisioning ability) can be thought as being complementary. Then condition (14) is
expected to hold, and the model predicts no extra-pair parentage. Consistent with this
prediction, no extra-pair paternity is found in the one hornbill species investigated to date
(Stanback et al., 2002), even though sperm storage by the female provided a wide window for
extra-pair copulations that could lead to fertilizations.
Such exclusive division of labour is rather rare in birds. In most species, the tasks
performed by males and females (such as territory defence or nestling provisioning) widely
overlap. If the male and female traits determine how effective each are in these tasks, those
traits will be substitutes in the offspring production function. In that case, inequality (14)
would be reversed, and extra-pair parentage is predicted. We can calculate from our model
the level of extra-pair paternity as a function of different parameters, which we do below to
derive predictions about interspecific patterns of extra-pair parentage.
PREDICTING ESTABLISHED PATTERNS
In this section we demonstrate that our model is compatible with currently documented
interspecific patterns, and discuss some theoretical advantages of our model over the
currently accepted hypotheses.
Extra-pair paternity and male parental contribution
One of the well-established patterns of extra-pair paternity is its relation to male parental
contribution across species. We show here that our model correctly predicts the negative
relationship between paternal care and levels of extra-pair paternity (Møller, 2000). We use a
Monte Carlo simulation approach. First, we specify a production function g(s, t), where s
and t are parental abilities of the males and the females, respectively. We take g(s, t) to be an
increasing, concave downward function of the sum hs + t. The parameter h denotes how
much the male’s parental ability is important relative to the female’s. Thus, h = 0 would
indicate that offspring production does not depend on paternal care, whereas h = 1 means
that paternal and maternal contributions affect offspring production equally. We generate
4 × 4 matrices using random numbers for si and tj, and determine the level of extra-pair
parentage at the core arrangement of the resulting matrix. (We use a 4 × 4 pairing matrix,
since it represents a more realistic neighbourhood size than a 2 × 2 situation, but simulation
results are qualitatively unchanged with matrix size. Detailed simulation procedure
and code in Mathematica are available in the Supporting Online Material at http://
www.evolutionary-ecology.com/data/2204code.nb.) Figure 1 plots the mean levels of extra-
pair paternity over 100 iterations for each value of h. Average levels of extra-pair paternity
(in terms of the percentage of total offspring) decrease as the relative importance of male
parental contribution increases. This is consistent with what has been found in comparisons
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across species of extra-pair paternity levels with respect to male contribution (Møller, 2000;
Arnold and Owens, 2002). The negative relationship comes about because the importance
of female productivity goes up with decreasing male contribution. Consequently, males
are willing to pay more to pair with highly productive females. Note that as h becomes
greater, the rate of extra-pair paternity goes down, but never quite reaches 0, because we
assumed that male and female traits are economic substitutes regardless of the value of h.
In reality, for species with essential male parental care (corresponding to h  1 in Fig. 1),
complementarity effects are likely to be important, and thus the rate of extra-pair paternity
should go down faster than depicted here.
The currently accepted explanation for the relationship between extra-pair paternity and
paternal care is based on the ‘constrained female hypothesis’ of Gowaty (1996). The con-
strained female hypothesis stipulates that female dependence on male help constrains her
extra-pair copulation behaviour, with more dependent females not being able to seek extra-
pair copulations. However, we note two problems with the constrained female hypothesis.
First, the hypothesis assumes a genetic benefit to females from extra-pair paternity to
explain why females should seek extra-pair copulations in the first place. This assumption
has little empirical support (Arnqvist and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Akçay and Roughgarden, 2007a). Second,
the constrained female hypothesis assumes that males respond to paternity loss by with-
holding care, but experimental studies testing this assumption yielded mixed results (e.g. Lifjeld
et al., 1998; Dickinson, 2003). Moreover, theoretical models of parental care do not always predict
that males should withhold care in response to loss of paternity (reviewed in Sheldon, 2002).
Male traits and extra-pair paternity
The most studied aspect of extra-pair paternity is its relation to male traits (Møller and
Ninni, 1998; Akçay and Roughgarden, 2007a), so we ask what our model can predict about this
relationship. The 2 × 2 example above already provides a hint: Male 1, who has higher
Fig. 1. Plot of mean levels of extra-pair paternity (% of total offspring produced from the pairing
matrix) versus the relative contribution of the male to offspring care, as determined by Monte Carlo
simulations. The production function used in these simulations is g(s, t) = √hs + t.
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productivity, receives paternity in Male 2’s nest in the core arrangement. More generally, the
condition for extra-pair parentage to occur is that high-productivity individuals should
pair with partners of lower productivity. Then, higher productivity individuals need to be
compensated for the loss of production they experience in their own nest. At the same time,
lower productivity individuals will be willing to concede some proportion of their nests’
parentage in exchange for the right to breed with highs. Put together, these indicate that
our model predicts positive correlations between individual productivities and the levels of
both within-pair paternity and extra-pair paternity. This is confirmed by Monte Carlo
simulations with random pairing matrices; Figs. 2 and 3 depict the results of two such
Fig. 2. Plot of within-pair paternity lost (in terms of number of extra-pair young in the nest) versus
male productivity in 30 randomly generated 4 × 4 games, corresponding to 120 males. The production
function is g(s, t) = 5√s + t. The line denotes the linear regression on all the points.
Fig. 3. Plot of extra-pair paternity gains in terms of number of offspring versus individual male
productivity in randomly generated games. The line denotes the linear regression; simulation details as
in Fig. 2.
Akçay and Roughgarden1234
simulations. Figure 2 shows that loss of paternity in absolute terms decreases as
male productivity increases. The same is true if one plots percent of paternity in the
nest, thus controlling for clutch size (not shown). The number of extra-pair young sired
in other nests also increases with individual productivity. However, both graphs exhibit
substantial variation because the level of extra-pair paternity at the core arrangement
depends on the whole pairing matrix. Thus, an individual with a given trait value might
end up with different levels of extra-pair paternity and within-pair paternity in different
matrices.
Our model thus predicts a positive relationship between male traits that increase
offspring production and both within-pair paternity and extra-pair paternity. Evidence
from several species suggests that such a correlation exists. For example, male and female
black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla) spend winter in flocks with linear dominance
hierarchies that determine access to food sources (Smith et al., 1991). Males higher in the
dominance hierarchy fledge more offspring (Otter et al., 1999), have higher within-pair paternity,
and are more likely to gain extra-pair paternity (Otter et al., 1998). Another example comes from
blue grosbeaks (Passerina caerulea), where males with brighter (bluer) breast plumage are
less likely to have extra-pair paternity in their nests. These males also provide more parental
care and have territories with higher insect abundance (Keyser and Hill, 2000). Finally, extra-pair
paternity and within-pair paternity are frequently correlated with age (Akçay and Roughgarden,
2007a), which is also a robust correlate of breeding success in many species (see Mauck et al., 2004, and
references therein). These patterns have been previously interpreted as supporting the genetic
benefits hypotheses. Our model provides an alternative interpretation. We discuss in
more detail below (‘Tests of the model’) how to distinguish between genetic benefits and the
current model.
Patterns of extra-pair maternity
Our model can also be used to predict interspecific patterns of extra-pair maternity (Arnold
and Owens, 2002). The most consistent correlate of extra-pair maternity is annual fecundity in
a species (Geffen and Yom-Tov, 2001; Arnold and Owens, 2002), where levels of extra-pair maternity as a
percentage of total offspring increase with increasing fecundity. One property that can
cause this pattern in our model is that maternity comes in strictly discrete units (i.e. eggs),
whereas paternity is probabilistic and thus can vary more or less continuously (in terms of
its expected value). Therefore, a maternity exchange prescribed by the core arrangement in
a given pairing matrix may simply not be feasible if it requires the transfer of, say, half an
egg. In species with high fecundity, however, transactions would be prohibited less often
by the discrete nature of maternity, since the proportion of maternity in a clutch
approaches a continuous variable. Therefore, all else being equal, high-fecundity species
should exhibit more extra-pair maternity. This is shown in Fig. 4, which depicts the results
from Monte Carlo simulations, where transactions of maternity occur only if they exceed
a certain threshold value. The prevailing hypothesis (Geffen and Yom-Tov, 2001) attributes
this pattern to the lower marginal cost of accepting an extra egg in species with large
clutches. Although our model differs somewhat from this hypothesis, the two models are
compatible.
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TESTS OF THE MODEL
We noted above that our cooperative game model predicts patterns that agree with current
evidence. In this section, we concentrate on how future empirical studies can distinguish
between the current model and others, specifically the genetic benefits hypotheses.
Our model predicts that individuals with higher offspring production will have higher
within-pair paternity and extra-pair paternity, which is similar to the genetic benefits
hypotheses at first glance. However, several features of our model can be used to distinguish
between these two hypotheses. First, the genetic benefits hypotheses postulate that extra-
pair young are consistently better than within-pair young (e.g. in survival to adulthood),
whereas our model makes no such prediction. This assumption of the genetic benefits
hypotheses is not supported by empirical data (Arnqvist and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Akçay and Roughgarden,
2007a). Although this by itself does not indicate direct support for the current model, it does
weaken the genetic benefits hypotheses.
We also predict that individual traits should be related to extra-pair paternity only when
they influence current offspring production from the nest, but regardless of whether they
are heritable or environmental. In contrast, the genetic benefits hypotheses predict that any
trait that influences total fitness (such as attractiveness, which is not necessarily related to
current nesting success) should be correlated with paternity, but only if it is heritable.
Currently, almost all empirical studies interpret any correlation between male traits and
paternity as a good genes effect, mostly without testing for the heritability of the trait or its
relation to total fitness. The reason for this seems to be a lack of alternative interpretations.
Our model, however, provides one, and many of the cases currently accepted as supporting
the good genes hypothesis might turn out to rely on non-heritable traits that are related
to current nest production (see Table 1). This can be assessed using a meta-analytic or
comparative approach for traits where measurements of heritabilities and fitness effects
exist.
Fig. 4. Plot of mean fecundity versus mean levels of extra-pair maternity in 100 simulations with
4 × 4 matrices. The production function is g(s, t) = f √s + t, where f is the parameter determining
fecundity. A maternity exchange only takes place in discrete units.
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Another prediction from our model is that extra-pair paternity should be associated with
disassortative pairing: extra-pair paternity occurs only when individuals with a lower trait
value are paired with individuals with a higher trait value. Such interactions are not
predicted by genetic benefits, and rarely measured in existing studies. Nonetheless, at least
one study indicates such an effect: Dietrich et al. (2004) showed that the level of extra-pair
paternity in their brood was repeatable within pairs, but not within individuals when they
change partners. Furthermore, they show that younger males paired to older females lose
more paternity than other pairings with respect to age. We suggest that future empirical
studies focus on the interaction between male and female traits.
Experimental studies can distinguish the current model from existing ones, such as
the constrained female hypothesis or the mate-guarding hypothesis. Both of the latter
hypotheses predict that levels of extra-pair paternity should be affected by environmental
factors such as food availability in the territory. The constrained female hypothesis predicts
that supplementing territories with food should decrease female dependence on male
help, which should result in increased extra-pair paternity in supplemented territories.
Conversely, the mate-guarding hypothesis predicts that extra-pair paternity should decrease
in supplemented territories, because both males and females spend more time at the nest
and it becomes easier for males to guard their partners. Three studies have measured the
effects of food addition. Two of them report decreases in extra-pair paternity (Westneat, 1994;
Václav et al., 2003) while one reports an increase (Hoi-Leitner et al., 1999).
Our model makes a more complex prediction. If food availability is an important
determinant of breeding success (i.e. influences the entries in the rows of the pairing
matrix), then supplementing poorer territories with food would amount to increasing the
entries for less productive males while leaving the other rows unchanged. Consequently, the
core arrangement would require less extra-pair parentage relative to controls. On the other
hand, if territories with richer than average food resources are supplemented, the entries for
more productive males will go up, which would increase the amount of extra-pair paternity
prescribed by the core allocation up until the point where the core switches to an assortative
pairing arrangement. Our model thus predicts that extra-pair paternity should decrease
with food addition in poor territories but increase in richer ones.
We have listed several possible tests to distinguish between the model presented
here and existing hypotheses. One can devise correlational and experimental tests in
other cases by first determining which ecological or phenotypic factors influence breeding
success, and then manipulating those factors to bring about changes in the pairing
matrix, leading to changes in the occurrence of extra-pair paternity. This experimental
approach enables immediate testing of the model without any major change in research
methods.
Table 1. Comparison between the predictions of the current model and the genetic benefits
hypothesis on whether male traits are correlated to within-pair and extra-pair paternity
Trait is heritable Trait is not heritable
Trait affects: Current nest Other fitness Current nest Other fitness
Current model Yes No Yes No
Genetic benefits Yes Yes No No
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At the same time, we believe that more research effort should be focused on behavioural
interactions between individuals. Considering the amount of effort poured into field studies
of the phenomenon in the last two decades, remarkably little is known about the actual
behavioural processes that lead to extra-pair parentage (a point made by Westneat and Stewart, 2003).
Perhaps the inattention to behaviour arose from the focus on genetic benefits. This focus did
not attribute great significance to behaviour, except to say when and with whom extra-pair
copulations should occur. But both the sexual conflict hypothesis and our model attribute
significance to actual behavioural events leading to extra-pair copulations, and both make
predictions about them. So these new hypotheses should spur the behavioural investigations
needed to test them. Our model explicitly stipulates the existence of a negotiation set-up
between individuals. Whether such mechanisms exist, and what their behavioural basis is,
need to be determined by observational studies. A possible candidate for the behavioural
basis of negotiations is male–male singing interactions [such as the dawn chorus (Burt and
Vehrencamp, 2005)], which are known to play important roles in territorial and social relations.
In the context of extra-pair paternity, for example, our model predicts that the extra-pair
males should be seen interacting with within-pair males before extra-pair copulations take
place. The presence of such correlations between behavioural interactions among males and
extra-pair copulations is readily testable but it requires a change of focus in field methods
on extra-pair paternity.
DISCUSSION
We make several assumptions in our model that are worth discussing more explicitly. The
first is that individuals can sense the pairing matrix and are able to calculate side-payments.
Theory has shown that honest signalling of phenotypic quality can be evolutionarily stable
(Grafen, 1990) and this notion has been confirmed empirically in several bird species (e.g. Hill, 1991;
Keyser and Hill, 2000). Thus it is reasonable to assume that birds can assess other individuals’
phenotypes, and with them, the entries to the pairing matrix. Furthermore, the core
is structurally stable with regard to small errors that individuals might make in their
assessment of the pairing matrix. Such small errors would perturb equations (7) and (8), but
only linearly. Some part (or the whole) of the real core would still be acceptable to all
players. A different class of information that might influence the outcome of negotiations
concerns individuals’ previous moves (e.g. whether they negotiate with a single individual or
with multiple individuals). Negotiations are likely to involve conspicuous signals such as
song, and it is reasonable to assume that individuals in a breeding neighbourhood have
common knowledge of them [e.g. due to ‘eavesdropping’ (Peake et al., 2001; Burt and Vehrencamp, 2005)].
The second assumption of the model is that no outside options are available to
individuals, such as settling in a different patch of woods, or postponing breeding
altogether. If these outside options can be expressed as an expected pay-off, they can easily
be incorporated into condition (5), without any major change to the model. A more
complicated situation can occur when one considers a patch of habitat occupied by
contiguous breeding territories, where individuals can choose both whether or not to join
a pairing matrix and which matrix to join. One would have to build a model that considers
all possible pairing matrices and predicts which pairing matrices should emerge from that
breeding neighbourhood. Our model can then be employed as a sub-model that generates
the pay-off consequences of each possible pairing matrix. Indeed, such an extended model
can explain the formation of breeding colonies (Wagner et al., 2000).
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Another issue concerns the assumption that parentage can be transferred without cost
and in a continuous and reliable manner. For paternity, we suggest that these assumptions
are reasonable. Even if males do not control the transfer of paternity directly, they might
trade copulation access to the female. This is well documented, for example, in dunnocks
(Burke et al., 1989). The genetic pay-offs for males in our model then should be interpreted as
expected paternities.
On the other hand, constraints that are not incorporated in our model are likely to be
important for maternity exchanges. Our model starts by regarding paternity and maternity
as symmetrical. However, the nature of maternity transfers is clearly different from
paternity transfers, and interspecific patterns indicate that extra-pair paternity is more
common than extra-pair maternity (Arnold and Owens, 2002). Taking into account the discrete
nature of eggs, as is done above (see ‘Patterns of extra-pair maternity’), breaks this
symmetry. Another property that would break the symmetry is that eggs are laid after being
fertilized, and therefore egg dumping is likely to involve transfer of paternity in addition to
maternity. A female laying eggs into another female’s nest might copulate with the male at
that nest and thereby grant him the paternity of some of her eggs (not necessarily the one
that she lays in his nest). However, this presumably would impose higher transaction costs,
making extra-pair maternity less likely to happen than our model predicts. The implication
is, then, that females frequently might not be compensated, which could lead to disagree-
ments, and possibly overt conflict. Nonetheless, overt conflict might not happen if other
types of benefits are also involved.
Another possibility is that females might not actually be players in the same game as the
males. This might happen if males arrive early, hold territories and negotiate, for example,
about territory boundaries among themselves. In that case, the columns of the pairing
matrices would correspond not to different females, but to different territory configurations.
Thus, the stable arrangement would only need transfer of parentage between males. Such a
situation might arise in many migratory bird species with males-first arrival patterns.
Reproductive transactions theory and cooperative games
We have discussed a new theoretical framework to study extra-pair parentage. We suggest
that extra-pair parentage (encompassing both extra-pair maternity and extra-pair
paternity) arises as reproductive transactions that stabilize the social pairing arrangement.
A similar role for extra-pair paternity has previously been proposed by Shellman-Reeve and
Reeve (2000), who stipulated that the social mates receive paternity in exchange for the
parental care they supply. Their model assumes that females prefer to mate with an extra-
pair male because of some genetic benefit, but at the same time need full-time parental
provisioning from their social mate. Our proposal agrees with their approach in principle,
but we demonstrate here that genetic benefits (which are not well supported by data) do not
need to be assumed for a transaction set-up to function.
More broadly, the current model can be seen as extending reproductive transactions
theory of cooperative breeding groups (Vehrencamp, 1983) to exchanges between monogamous
pairs. The basic idea in our model, namely that parentage can be exchanged for some
ecological benefit, is analogous to the logic of reproductive skew models. In this context,
cooperative games can be viewed as a new modelling tool for reproductive transactions
theory. A major advantage of cooperative game theory over existing reproductive skew
models is that it lets the coalition structure (group composition) as well as the pay-off
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distribution (skew) emerge from the model. Here, we have constrained the groups to
be monogamous pairs. However, the model can easily be extended to polygynous
and polyandrous groups as well. In that way, cooperative game theory can enable a
generalization of reproductive skew theory to all mating systems.
The model presented here would apply to a broad variety of bird species, but other types
of exchanges might also cause extra-pair parentage. Therefore, we suggest that parentage
should be viewed as the common currency across bird species that can buy different
commodities and services. These include provisioning, nest defence, viable sperm, as well as
risk sharing through dispersing parentage over different nests. Specifically for extra-pair
paternity, the relation of such ecological benefits to extra-pair parentage, with the possible
exception of viable sperm (Griffith, 2007), remains understudied compared with putative genetic
benefits. A reproductive transactions approach will focus attention on these understudied
possibilities. Such an approach might potentially lead to a unified explanation of extra-pair
parentage by mapping the variation in the patterns of such parentage to the variation in the
ecologically relevant commodities and services.
Our approach here forms part of the social selection research program outlined in
Roughgarden et al. (2006). In a recent article, McNamara et al. (2006) criticized this program
for its use of cooperative game theory. McNamara et al. claim cooperative games cannot
describe animal interactions, because animals ‘do not have a legal system’, and so cannot
engage in binding ‘contracts’. However, the only requirements for binding contracts are the
abilities to monitor the bargain and to revert to the default pay-offs if the agreement is not
honoured. Such abilities appear well within the range of animal capabilities. Given these
abilities, neither party would have an incentive to deviate from an agreement, as this would
result in a lower individual pay-off.
The basic theoretical structure of the social selection program relies on a two-tier
approach. One tier is behavioural: interactions between animals result in the formation of
social systems and generate pay-offs. The other tier is evolutionary: traits that function
in social interactions evolve according to their fitness consequences. In this formulation,
natural selection may well select for behavioural mechanisms that enable negotiations and
agreements, and allow the behavioural tier to be modelled using cooperative games. The
evolutionary tier, on the other hand, will still employ conventional evolutionary game
theory and population genetics as explicit models of the natural selection process.
To summarize, we propose to reconsider the traditional view of extra-pair parentage that
relies on empirically unsupported genetic benefits hypotheses. We also suggest that newer
approaches based on sexual conflict do not provide a satisfactory answer. Instead, we
suggest that extra-pair parentage can be the result of commodity or service exchanges that
are negotiated and agreed upon. Individuals belong to a social and economic breeding
system that co-exists alongside the genetic. In this non-genetic system, individuals trade in
the currency of parentage. We propose to model such transactions using cooperative game
theory, and present a model for one type of commodity, breeding mates. We believe that an
approach based on reproductive transactions to gain ecological benefits will bring new
insights to the study of extra-pair parentage.
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